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GRANTS FOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE
1ORIGIN OF THE PRESENT PROGRAM OF CATEGORICAL RELIEF
Until the depression after 1929 traditional opinion held strongly that the
federal government had no responsibility for relief of unemployment or
for direct relief. Unemployed employables and unemployables alike, as
far as they were a charge upon government, depended upon state-local
action. This position was gradually undermined by the continuance of
depression and in May 1933 FERA was established to cope with the whole
problem of relief. A grant scheme was adopted because most of the states
already had relief organizations. To set up a federal relief organization
would have meant delay and would have run counter to the precept that
efficient administration of relief depends upon decentralization. In one
important respect, however, the FERA scheme was to be unlike other
grant schemes: in place of a matching provision, the administrator was
given discretion to distribute as he saw fit.
Harry Hopkins, the administrator, soon encountered difficulties with the
grant scheme. The states and localities wanted to spend for direct relief
whereas he preferred work relief; friction arose over federal conditions;
administrative determination of the proper federal share of the costs of
projects became a game of bluff and pressure.' The result was that in 1935
WPA was set up as a substitute for FERA to provide work relief, not
through the device of grants, but by outright federal expenditure. Direct
1This statement is supported by descriptions of FERA by V. 0. Key, The A dminis-
tration of Federal Grants to States (Public Administration Service, 1937),pp. 349-53;
Bitterman, State and Federal Grants-in-Aid, pp. 298-304; E. A. Williams, Federal
Aid for Relief (Columbia University Press, 1939), Ch. V, as well as by Congressional
Hearings. Key concludes (p. 351) that "the experience of FERA in attempting to
fix the amount of the state contribution by administrative discretion indicates that
whenever feasible the matching requirement should be fixed by statute rather than
by administrative discretion". Williams examines the "allocation problems of the
FERA" in detail and remarks (pp. 202-3): "Indeed, the question of state and local
contributions was a constant thorn in the side of the FERA. In some instances, state
and local governments made reasonable attempts to produce funds; in other states,
however, there were continual attempts to unload the entire burden of emergency
relief upon the federal agency. ... Theresult, of course, was bickering between the
FERA and certain states, accompanied by threats upon the part of the FERA to
withhold all federal funds or to assume direct control of relief if suitable state action
were not forthcoming."
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relief, i.e., general assistance, was thrown back to state and local govern-
ments, though not entirely: by the Social Security Act the federal gov-
ernment gave assistance to the states in for certain categories of
unemployables —theaged poor, dependent children, and the blind. It set
up also two insurance systems for employables: one, operated entirely by
the federal government, provided old age insurance; the other, operated
on a federal-state basis, provided unemployment insurance which was
expected to become the first line of defense against depression. Two points
to hold in mind are: the insurance schemes have left uncovered a consider-
able number of employables who must, therefore, if they fall in need, rely
upon private charity or an assistance program; general, as distinct from
categorical assistance, is entirely a state-local responsibility.
2IMPORTANCE OF THE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
In December 1950, 2,786,000 persons were receiving old age assistance,
1,661,000 children in 651,000 families aid to dependent children, 97,500
persons aid to the blind, and 413,000 persons general assistance. Thus
over 3,947,000 persons were on public assistance in a year of general
prosperity, and total governmental payments for them in 1950 were
$2,624,200,000. In future years growth in the number entitled to benefits
under OASI, extension of the coverage of OASI and of unemployment
insurance, together with liberalization of benefits, may be expected to
reduce the number of recipients of public assistance. But public assistance
seems likely to remain an important part of the welfare program of govern-
ment, and, in terms of expenditure, an important element in the system of
federal grants.
At present the federal government helps state and local governments
care for needy persons who are too old, too young, or too handicapped by
blindness to look out for themselves. Federal grants set ceilings, but no
floor, on the payment per recipient the federal government will share with
the state-local governments. For the needy aged and the blind, it will reim-
burse three-quarters of the first $20 of the average monthly payment plus
half of the remainder, up to a maximum of $50 per month to a recipient;
it pays also half the cost of administration. For dependent children the
federal grant is three-quarters of the first $12 of the average monthly
payment to one child and half of the remainder, except that state-local
expenditures over $27 per month for the first child and $18 for each subse-
quent child are not to count in reckoning the grant; it pays also half the
cost of administration. Except for these limits per recipient, the federal
obligation is not restricted. The categorical grants are open-end and their
total annual amount is determined by state-local decisions concerning
eligibility and payments.PUBLIC ASSISTANCE GRANTS AND BUSINESS CYCLES 33




Old age assistance 53.7 73.2 (Mississippi) 38.9 (Colorado)
Aid to dependent children 46.3 72.8 (Alabama) 30.7 (Massachusetts)
Aid to blind 50.9 71.6 (Kentucky) 34.7 (California)
Source: Social Security Bulletin, September 1951, p. 52.
3CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR
Total governmental payments (and federal grants) for these three cate-
gorical programs grew steadily from $218 million in 1936 to $2,066 mil-
lion in 1950 (Table 16). The slight decline in aid to dependent children
between 1942 and 1945 was much more than offset by increases in the
other payments. Sensitivity to changes in general business conditions is not
apparent.
The behavior of the payments series, however, conceals variability in
the number of recipients (Table 17 and especially Chart 5). Recipients
of old age assistance declined from a peak of 2,254,000 in June 1942 to
2,033,000 in August 1945, or 10 percent. The number of children receiv-
ing aid for dependent children fell from a peak of 955,000 in February
Table 16
Categorical Assistance, Average Monthly Payments per
Recipient and Total Payments by Program, 193 6-1950
Average Monthly Payment




Old age(per Old age (per
assistance family)Blind assistancefamily)Blind TOTAL
1936 18.79 29.8226.11 155,241 49,65412,813 217,708
193719.46 31.46 310,442 70,45116,171 397,064
193819.56 31.9625.22 392,384 97,44218,958 509,784
193919.30 31.7725.44 430,480 114,94920,752 566,181
194020.26 32.3835.38 474,952 133,24321,826 630,021
194121.27 33.6225.82 541,519 153,15322,901 717,573
194223.37 36.2526.54 595,152 158,43524,660 768,247
194326.66 41.5727.95 653,171 140,94225,143 819,256
194428.43 45.5829.31 693,338 135,01525,342 853,695
194530.88 52.0533.52 726,550 149,66726,557 902,774
1946 35.31 62.2336.67 822,061 208,85730,748 1,061,666
194737.42 63.0139.58 989,720 294,96136,252 1,320,933
194842.02 71.8843.54 1,132,604 364,16041,382 1,538,146
194944.76 74.1946.11 1,380,398 475,36148,532 1,904,290
195043.09 71.4445.99 1,461,836 551,62752,697 2,066,160
Data through 1942 cover only continental United States; thereafter include Alaska
and Hawaii. Programs administered without federal participation included.
December data.
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1942to633,000 in October 1944, or 44 percent. The blind receiving assis-
tance reached a peak of 60,000 in October 1943, then declined to 55,000
in June1945,8 percent. From these lows in 1944-45 the number of recipi-
ents turned sharply upward once more. The number receiving old age
assistance reached 2,809,000 in September 1950 —arise of 38 percent
from the low of August 1945. The number of dependent children receiving
aid rose by October 1950 to 1,668,000, 164 percent, while the blind
receiving aid rose by December 1950 to 79,000, 44 percent. It appears,
therefore, that a shortage of manpower, high money earnings, and gener-
ous government allowances to dependents of servicemen during the war
reduced somewhat the number on categorical assistance. Some were added
to the labor force. After V-J Day, despite continuance of prosperity, these
marginal workers —personsover 65 years and mothers with dependent
children —dropped,or were dropped, out of the labor force, and as ser-
vicemen were demobilized their dependents shifted to public assistance
programs.
The reason total payments do not disclose this war and postwar varia-
tion is that the change in number was offset by the increase in the average
payment per recipient which rose sharply after 1941 and still more sharply
after 1945, reflecting the rise in prices as well as relative ease in state-local
budgets.2
The conclusion to draw from the record appears to be that payments for
categorical assistance, particularly for old age assistance, and aid to the
blind have little built-in flexibility. Since 1935 they have risen steadily
and it might perhaps be assumed that the rise will continue, depending
on such factors as the number over 65yearsand insurance coverage, not
2Anotherfactor responsible for some of the rise was the more generous federal
participation in 1939, 1946, and 1948. In 1939 the federal government raised the
maximum payment per recipient for which it would reimburse to the extent of half
from $30 to $40 monthly in the case of old age assistance and aid to the blind. The
basis for grants to dependent children was changed from $1 for each $2, within
ceilings of $18 for the first child and $12 for each additional child, to a 50-50 basis.
In 1946 the federal share of payments to recipients of old age assistance and aid to
the blind was increased by providing grants of two-thirds of the first $15 of the
average monthly payment plus half of the remainder up to a ceiling of $45. For
dependent children the federal share became two-thirds of the first $9 of the average
payment per child plus half of the remainder within maximums of $24 for the first
child and $15 for each additional child. In 1948 the federal government agreed to
provide three-fourths of the first $20 of the average monthly payment plus half of
the remainder within maximums of $50 for old age assistance and the blind, and
three-quarters of the first $12 of the average payment per dependent child plus half
of the remainder within maximums of $27 for the first child and $18 for each addi-
tional child.38 CHAPTER 3
upon fluctuations in business activity. But the record needs to be supple-
mented and interpreted in the light of other circumstances. For one thing,
until 1941 the categorical program was new, and growth was to be
expected. The states always had a backlog of pending applicants who were
held off because state-local funds were lacking. The effect of any moderate
improvement in economic conditions was merely to diminish the backlog
without decreasing total payments. A second factor is that the period after
1941 was unusual in a different way. State-local finances were prosperous.
As the rise in prices put some squeeze upon recipients, the average pay-
ment was raised and this more than offset the decline in recipients. One
may conclude that the average payment is sensitive to upward changes in
the price level, a conclusion supported by the very nature of subsistence
payments. One may not safely conclude that the average payment is sensi-
tive to a decline in prices during depression. The historical trend toward
higher welfare standards and the belief that subsistence payments should
be maintained will operate against it. Depression would, to be sure, bring
an increase in recipients and, therefore, a heavier financial burden upon
state-local governments. This pressure, if prolonged, might force a decline
in average payments.
Balancing all considerations, some of which are imponderable, it seems
likely that payments for categorical services on the present basis will dem-
onstrate only slight built-in flexibility. In prosperity a modest decline in
recipients, and therefore in total payments, is likely to be offset by larger
average payments attributable to prosperity and to a rise in living costs;
in a severe and long depression an increase in recipients and therefore in
total payments will encounter the obstacle of a weakened state-local fiscal
capacity. A mild depression may not seriously strain state-local finances,
and some upward flexibility in payments can be expected.
Although the present system of categorical assistance is unlikely to show
much built-in flexibility, it could be altered so as to introduce some flexi-
bility. Alteration is, moreover, worthy of examination because, in the opin-
ion of many observers, the present system is defective in several respects.
These defects, which are not revealed in the over-all examination given
above, will be surveyed briefly in order to find a basis from which revision,
particularly of federal grants, might be appraised.
4DEFECTS OF CATEGORICAL GRANTS
One of the most serious charges made against the present system of cate-
gorical grants is that it has distorted state budgets. The 'distortions' are
both interstate and intrastate. Interstate distortion occurs when some states
have too many eligible recipients, or draw disproportionally large amountsPUBLIC ASSISTANCE GRANTS AND BUSINESS CYCLES S 39
in grants, as compared with other states; and conversely when some states
have too few recipients and draw too little as grants. Intrastate distortion
occurs when a state spends disproportionally on these functions compared
with other functions. In a federal nation, heterogeneous in standards, cus-
toms, and wealth, uniformity in such matters would not be expected. The
relevant issue is the degree to which the diversity is a matter for federal
concern.
interstate Differences in Eligibility: The Social Security Act specifies cer-
tain conditions for the receipt of grants, e.g., age, residence, etc., but
the federal government has no voice in defining need and hence no control
over the number declared eligible. This is a matter for state determination;
as a result, the relative number of recipients varies widely (Table 18 and
Chart 6). For example, the proportion per 1,000 of the population 65 and
older receiving old age assistance in December 1948 ranged from 791 in
Louisiana and 593 in Oklahoma to 58 in Delaware and 67 in New Jersey.
Some tendency exists for the 'rich' states, those with higher than average
per capita income, to have a low recipient rate, and for 'poor' states, those
with lower than average per capita income, to have a high one, but excep-
tions are numerous.3 It seems certain that a considerable part of this varia-
tion arises from differences in definition and appraisal of need, as well as
from differences in need itself. The Advisory Council on Social Security
to the Senate Committee on Finance has recently suggested that "a special
investigation of this matter is worthy of consideration".4
interstate Variation in Average Payments: Here and in subsequent discus-
sion average payments per recipient will be used as a convenient measure
of the extent to which assistance needs are being met. However, payments
to recipients are often partial. If, for example, state authorities use a mini-
mum budget of $80 monthly as a starting point, deductions will be made
of an applicant's income from such sources as OASI and free use of a
house. If these amount to $60, only the unmet need, $20 monthly, would
8The rank correlation coefficient between the recipient rate for old age assistance
and per capita income (Table 18) is —038; for aid to dependent children it is —0.39.
'80th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document 204, Public Assistance p. 5. Eveline
M. Burns describes the following case: "In June, 1942, 4 old-age assistance agencies
in each of the 48 states and the District of Columbia were presented with a hypo-
thetical but typical case, and asked whether under their own rules and regulations,
they would regard the applicant as needy and therefore eligible for aid. Of the 125
agencies in 44 states and the District of Columbia who replied, 57 would have con-
sidered the applicant ineligible because not needy, while 68 would have considered
him eligible. In 15 (mostly eastern) states and the District of Columbia he would
have been ineligible; in 20 (mostly western) states he would have been eligible; and
in 9 states he would have been eligible in some areas and ineligible in others." The










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Tables 18 and 19.
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be the assistance payment. One state might conceivably have a lower aver-
age payment because a larger proportion of its recipients have income from
other sources or because living costs are different. No definition of a 'satis-
factory' minimum level of payments is offered here, although comparisons
with the average level for the nation are made. Differences in living costs
for Old Age Assistance per 1,000 Persons 65 and Older,
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from state to state, which may be another factor affecting the level of
payments, are disregarded. The reasons are that a satisfactory method of
measuring and allowing for such differences has not been devised and that
the differences among states appear to be moderate.5
Average payments tend to be higher in richer and lower in poorer states
(the rank coefficient is +.61; Table 19 and Chart 7), although a few 'poor'
states, notably Louisiana and Oklahoma, make relatively large average
payments for old age assistance, and a few 'rich' states, notably Delaware
and Maryland, make relatively small payments. In terms of average pay-
ment ability to pay is apparently decisive as against need, while in recipient
rates need is apparently more influential than ability to pay. A similar situ-
ation exists also for aid to dependent children and the blind. Federal grants
have, it appears, allowed a wide spread to prevail in these payments which
are subject to a means test.
Interstate Differences in Grants: Expenditures per inhabitant for public
assistance from federal funds 1936-48 vary widely from state to state and
a rank correlation of these figures with per capita income 1945-47 discloses
no clear pattern (the coefficient is +.21; Table 20). Of the pair of states
receiving the highest amounts, Colorado and Oklahoma, and of the pair
receiving the lowest, Delaware and Virginia, one of each is 'poor' and one
is 'rich'. If the states are split into those above and those below average
per capita income in 1945-47, of the 30 states below average in income
14 received lower than average federal grants per inhabitant 1936-48, and
16 higher. Of the 19 states above average in income, 9 received lower than
average grants, and 10 higher. Some 'rich' states, Delaware, New Jersey,
Maryland, Connecticut, New York, have received relatively small grants
and have a relatively low recipient rate (Table 18), and some 'poor' states,
Oklahoma, Utah, Missouri, Arizona, have received large grants and have
a relatively high recipient rate. Conversely, some 'rich' states such as Cob-
See Hansen and Perloff, State and Local Finance in the National Economy (Norton,
1944), pp. 3 1-3. The Bureau of Labor Statistics figures relate mostly to urban areas.
Figures showing the cost of living for 34 cities in 25 states are given in the Monthly
Labor Review, February 1948. In June 1947 the estimated cost of a city worker's
family budget ranged from $3,004 in New Orleans to $3,458 in Washington, D. C.
This range is much smaller, both absolutely and relatively, than that in state per
capita incomes (cf. Table 19). Even the rural-urban differences in living costs appear
to be small relative to inter-state income differences. For example, Nathan Koffsky
calculated that in 1945 a farm budget cost 18 percent more and a city budget 8 per-
cent more at city prices than at farm prices (Studies in Income and Wealth, Volume
Eleven, p. 175). For December 1948 the Department of Public Assistance of Pennsyl-
vania found that the costs per month for five "common items of need (food, clothing,
incidentals, shelter maintenance) averaged 8 percent higher in 4 urban than in
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Average Payments for Old Age Assistance, December 1948,
and Per Capita Income, 1945—1947, by States
CHAPTER 3
Source: Table 19.
rado,Washington, California, Montana have received large grants and
also have a high recipient rate, and 'poor' states such as North Carolina,
Mississippi, South Carolina, Alabama, Kentucky, Georgia, Arkansas have
received small grants despite a high recipient rate. This is possible because
the federal system of grants for old age assistance, the blind, and dependent
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Table 20
Public Assistance, Expenditure per Inhabitant from Federal Funds, 193 6-1948
Rank in Rank in
perCapita per Capita
Income Average Income Average
1945-47 PaymentRank 1945-47 Payment Rank
1Nevada $42.08 (19) 25Idaho $53.43(10)
2New York 25.78 (34) 26Kansas 38.52 (26)
3California 62.07 (5) 27Missouri 55.87 (8)
4Connecticut 24.00 (37) 28Utah 63.32 (4)
5Delaware 13.47 (48) 29Vermont 31.33 (31)
6Illinois 41.68 (20) 30Minnesota 51.98 (11)
7District of 31Iowa 44.20 (16)
Columbia 13.50 (47) 32Maine 40.03 (23)
8NewJersey 16.77 (44) 33Florida 46.15 (13)
9Montana 57.10 C6) 34Arizona 56.15( 7)
10Rhode Island 27.65 (33) 35New Hampshire32.12 (30)
11Massachusetts 55.71 (9) 36Texas 44.82 (15)
12Maryland 21.97 (40) 37Virginia 8.60 (49)
13Washington 84.04 (3) 38New Mexico 35.19 (29)
14Ohio 43.27 (17) 39WestVirginia 25.56(35)
15North Dakota 36.85 (28) 40Tennessee 25.44 (36)
16Michigan 40.11(22) 41Oklahoma 94.22 (2)
17Colorado 109.03 (1) 42Louisiana 40.92(21)
18Wyoming 39.89(24) 43Georgia 22.63(39)
19Pennsylvania 29.24(32) 44NorthCarolina14.98(46)
20Wisconsin 39.85(25) 45Kentucky 20.67(41)
21Oregon 42.27(18) 46Alabama 18.49(42)
22SouthDakota 45.80 (14) 47SouthCarolina17.44(43)
23Indiana 37.40(27) 48Arkansas 23.15 (38)
24Nebraska 47.96(12) 49Mississippi 16.45(45)
Source: Social Security Act Amendments of 1949, pp. 53, 461. For per capita income
see Table 19.
mately equal matching ratios;° i.e., federal grants are directly related to
the amount of state-local expenditures.
8Thechanges in 1946 and 1948, which increased the federal share to three-quarters
for the first $20 of payments for old age assistance and aid to the blind, and for the
first $12 of payments for dependent children, apply to the 'rich' states as well as to
the 'poor'. Compared with an outright system of variable grants based on per capita
income, the new basis is favorable to the 'rich' states. Nevertheless, the federal share
of expenditure for categorical assistance has gone well above 50 percent for most of
the 'poor' states (those below average in per capita income, 1945-47).
Federal %ofExpenditure for
Categorical Assistance, Number of States










Source:SocialSecurity Act Amendments of 1949, p. 30.46 CHAPTER 3
Interstate Differences in Is the relatively low level of payments by
many of the poorer states attributable to their poverty or to a lack of fiscal
effort? In this study per capita income is taken as a measure of the richness
or poverty of a state and the percentage of income payments devoted to a
major function as a measure of fiscal effort.7 Obviously, however, the same
percentage of income payments will produce a relatively larger or smaller
sum accordingly as a state is 'rich' or 'poor'. For example, an amount equal
to approximately 0.27 percent of income (in addition to federal grants)
allowed New York, a 'rich' state, to make average payments in June 1947
of $46.99 to recipients of old age assistance, $52.28 to recipients of assis-
tance to the blind, and $98.02 to families in receipt of aid to dependent
children (Table 21). All these were well above the averages for the nation
—$36.04,$37.91, and $61.68 respectively —yetin terms of income pay-
ments the 0.27 percent for New York was below the national figure, 0.36
percent. The situation of New York in this respect is similar to 10 of the 19
states which are above average in per capita income (Table 21). And as
long as the actual payments of a state to recipients of a welfare program
are not less than the national average, the fact that its fiscal effort falls
below the average fiscal effort of the nation may be of little moment.
When, however, the actual payments of a state are less than the national
average, the question whether its fiscal effort falls below average is worth
consideration. Fiscal effort by 'poor' states ties in with the question whether
the federal government, through grants, should bear a larger share of the
cost of their public assistance programs. A reasonable prior condition to
the assumption of a larger federal share may be that a poor state make a
fiscal effort equal to that of the states as a whole.
When we examine the fiscal effort of the 'poor' states with respect to
categorical assistance, we find a wide spread in percentage expenditure:
14 of the 30 states that were below average in terms of per capita income
1945-47 spent less in fiscal 1947 as a percentage of 1946 income payments
than the national average, 0.36 percent (Table 22). If these were to
increase their fiscal effort by spending 0.36 percent, the average payment
SeeSelma J. Mushkin, Determination of State-Local Fiscal Capacity (statement
before the Research Section of the National Association of Tax Administrators,
June 24, 1949), for a summary review and appraisal of these measures. John L.
Fulmer shows that "89 percent of the variation in per capita income between states
in 1940 was associated" with the percentage of the labor force in agriculture, forestry,
and fisheries, percentage of total population employed, percentage of total popula-
tion Negro, and median years of schooling of males 25 years or older. The per-
centage of total population employed was the most important of the four factors,


























































































































































































































































Assistance, Average Payments, June 1947Av. Payment
Fiscal 1947,Aid to for Old Age
as %of dependent Assistance,
1946 Incomechildren,Aid to Old ageAssurningAv.
Paymentsper familyblindassistance FiscalEffort*a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
STATES BELOW AVERAGE IN CAPITA INCOME, 1945-47 (concluded)
Below Average in
Piscal
r4ew Hampshire .35 $78.45 $39.70 $36.70 $37.74
Wisconsin .34 86.37 36.55 36.00 38.12
Arkansas .30 36.12 21.27 18.25 21.90
Mississippi .29 26.43 23.87 17.32 21.50
Vermont .25 46.34 36.88 30.81 44.37
Georgia .25 35.30 20.42 17.04 24.54
Alabama .24 31.48 20.00 17.54 26.31
Indiana .23 42.49 32.31 30.33 47.47
Tennessee .23 35.09 22.93 18.38 28.77
South Carolina .23 27.60 23.98 20.23 31.66
Kentucky .22 35.06 18.40 17.38 28.44
West Virginia .19 28.90 18.06 15.08 28.57
North Carolina .13 35.44 25.95 18.05 49.98
Virginia .07 39.46 22.72 17.63 90.67
SUMMARY AVERAGES
United States .36 61.68 37.91 36.04
States above Average




states) .57 83.91 48.07 46.98
Below average in
fiscal (10
states) .20 71.04 39.67 38.59
All 'rich' states (19).37 77.48 43.87 42.56
States below Average




states) .53 58.43 40.58 37.18
Below average in
fiscal effort* (14
states) .24 41.75 25.93 22.20 37.15
All 'poor' states (30).39 50.65 33.74 30.19
*Fiscaleffort is measured by the ratio of expenditures for categorical assistance,
fiscal 1947, to 1946 income payments (col. 1). Average fiscal effort was 0.36 percent.
The calculation is for 'poor' states only, and it is crude since it is derived by increas-
ing the figures of column 4 in the ratios that those of column 1 are to 0.36 percent.PUBLIC ASSISTANCE GRANTS AND BUSINESS CYCLES 49
Table 22
'Poor' and 'Rich' States According to Expenditure for Categorical Assistance
Fiscal 1947 as Percentage of Income Payments 1946
Expenditure
as % of Number of States
Income Payments 'Poor' 'Rich'
.06-.15 2 4
.16- .25 8 2
.26-.35 4 4
.36- .45 9 6
.46- .55 3










per recipient for old age assistance of 6 would be above, and of 8 would
still be below, the national average, $36.04 (Table 21, col. 5). The 8 are
the poorest of the 'poor' states. They could not achieve the national average
level of payments to recipients even if they made an average fiscal effort.
Furthermore, the norm selected here can be criticized as too high on the
ground that expenditure for old age assistance as a function is itself too
large relative to other functions because of the stimulus of federal grants;
this point is examined in the next section.
Intrastate Distortion: Another major criticism of categorical grants, espe-
cially those for old age assistance, is the distortion they are said to have
brought into state budgets. Striking evidence of distortion has been pre-
pared by the Council of State Governments. Comparison of payments for
old age assistance, which receives federal aid, with those for general assis-
tance, which does not receive federal aid, shows the ratios given in Table
23. At the extremes are Delaware and New York, which spent one and a
fifth and one and two-fifths times as much for old age assistance as for
general assistance, and Mississippi and Texas which spent 125 and 87
times as much. TheCouncil, in a study prepared for the Hoover Commis-
sion, made a similar comparison between expenditures for all federally
aided assistance programs and expenditures for general assistance. It found
the same disparities. At the extremes are New York, which in 1946 spent
3 times as much for old age assistance, aid to the blind, and to dependent
children as for general assistance, and Mississippi, which spent 189 times
as much. The Council declared that "the imbalances can be explained in50 CHAPTER3
Table 23
Ratios of Payments to Recipients of Old Age Assistance to Payments for
General Assistance, July 1948
Rank in Rank in
per Capita per Capita
Income Income
1945-47 RatioRank 1945-47 RatioRank
1Nevada 16.0(16) 25Kansas 7.4(31)
2 New York 1.4(47) 26Missouri 10.3(22)
3California 7.7(29) 27Utah 4.8(37)
4Connecticut 5.1(36) 28Vermont 11.3(19)
5Delaware 1.2(48) 29Minnesota 9.8(24)
6Illinois 3.9(40) 30Iowa 25.2(10)
7NewJersey 2.8(44) 31Maine 4.7(38)
8Montana 12.3(18) 32Florida 32.7 (6)
9Rhode Island 3.1(42) 33Arizona 8.5(26)
10Massachusetts 6.8(33) 34 New Hampshire 6.7(34)
11Maryland 2.4(45) 35Texas 86.7( 2)
12Washington 7.4(30) 36Virginia 3.8(41)
13Ohio 5.3(35) 37 New Mexico 7.9(28)
14NorthDakota 16.7(14) 38WestVirginia 8.5(27)
15Michigan 3.1(43) 39Tennessee 50.8( 4)
16Colorado 20.4(13) 40Oklahoma 57.1 C3)
17Wyoming 10.6(20) 41Louisiana 9.3(25)
18Pennsylvania 2.4(46) 42Georgia 34.1( 5)
19Wisconsin 10.1(23) 43North Carolina 16.0(15)
20Oregon 4.3(39) 44Kentucky 26.3( 9)
21South Dakota 24.9(11) 45Alabama 12.6(17)
22Indiana 7.2(32) 46South Carolina 10.4(21)
23Nebraska 24.7(12) 47Arkansas 27.4( 8)
24Idaho 28.5( 7) 48Mississippi 125.4 (1)
Source: Council of State Governments, Federal Grants to the States, p. 159.
large part by the fact that States with relatively few tax resources distort
their budgets to take advantage of national grants. By doing so, they are
forced to neglect State programs for which no national matching exists."8
The claim of neglect will be examined in detail for general assistance.
5GENERAL ASSISTANCE: ITS PRESENT POSITION
Responsibility for general assistance lies at present with state-local govern-
ments, unsupported by federal grants. This is a catch-all program which
covers not only unemployables, who are ineligible for categorical aid, but
also employables who are outside the insurance programs. Obviously
needy unemployables under 65yearsof age and not blind fall upon general
assistance. In addition, unemployment insurance excludes the jobs of 12
million wage earners; and covered workers may be unemployed because
of illness or may receive inadequate benefits or exhaust their benefits.
OASI, even after the expansion of 1950, covers only two-thirds of all civil-
'81st Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document 81, p. 54.PUBLIC ASSISTANCE GRANTS AND BUSINESS CYCLES 51
ian jobs and its benefits are often insufficient to support the recipients. In
all such instances employables and retired workers may be pushed upon
public assistance. If a sharp line could be drawn between employables
and unemployables, if all retired workers were covered adequately by
OASI and all employables by unemployment insurance, the number of
actual or potential recipients of public assistance, and particularly of gen-
eral assistance, would be greatly reduced. But these are 'ifs', not facts. The
number of recipients of general assistance, and state-local payments, have
varied widely (Table 24, Chart 5). From a peak of 1,996,000 in February
1938, the number fell to 229,000 in August 1945; payments dropped from
$46,700,000 in March 1939 to $6,600,000 in July 1945. From August
1945 to December 1949 the number increased 145 percent and payments
more than quadrupled.
The situation with respect to general assistance is of importance in a
cyclical study of grants because the number of recipients appears to be
fairly sensitive to changes in business conditions. The figures corrected for
seasonal variation (Table 24 B, and Chart 5) show that a low was reached
in June-August 1937, then rose sharply to a peak in July 1938 (with one
interruption in April). This low was just a month behind the peak of
May 1937 selected as the standard reference date by the NBER, and the
high was also just a month behind the trough in June 1938. The reconver-
sion recession after February 1945 coincided with another low point
although the number (corrected) of recipients remained almost unchanged
until August. The recession starting in November 1948 is less clearly
marked, although the increase in the rate of growth of recipients seems to
reflect this factor. The rate of growth, which was over 5 percent 1947-48,
became approximately 12 percent from December 1948 to December
1949. Some of the relative stability of the figures for categorical assistance
is a reflection of the high variability of the figures for general assistance.
The general assistance program is a shock absorber for a large number of
persons in the event of depression. It is doubtful that many of the 'poor'
states could stand the extra burden which a severe depression would bring.
Not only do the 'poor' states make very low average payments (Table
25) and a small fiscal effort;° even more important, the number of recipi-
ents of general assistance is disproportionately low in the 'poor' states.
States with few recipients of general assistance are typically 'poor' (Mary-
land is a notable exception), and those with a high number are typically
'rich' (Louisiana, Maine, and Missouri are exceptions); the rank correla-
tion coefficient between per capita income 1945-47 and the recipient rate
In fiscal 1947 state and local expenditure for general assistance was 0.08 percent of
income payments in 1946. But only 15 states exceeded this average effort, of which





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































General Assistance, Average Monthly Payment per Recipient, December 1948
Rank in Rank in
per Capita per Capita
Income Average Income Average
1945-47 Payment Rank 1945-47 Payment Rank
1Nevada $20.48(36) 23Nebraska $33.04(27)
2New York 71.85 (1) 24Idaho 30.66(28)
3California 49.22(11) 25Kansas 46.12(17)
4Connecticut 47.77(14) 26Missouri 30.36(29)
5Delaware 34.93(26) 27Utah 56.36 (4)
6Illinois 54.82 (6) 28Minnesota 48.60(12)
7District of 29Iowa 28.62(31)
Columbia 47.71(15) 30Maine 41.32(22)
8NewJersey 57.89 (3) 31Arizona 37.71(24)
9Montana 27.19(33) 32 New Hampshire44.09(19)
10Rhode Island 49.70(10) 33Virginia 22.35(35)
11Massachusetts 53.58 (7) 34 New Mexico 22.36(34)
12Maryland 43.38(20) 35West Virginia 14.88(41)
13Washington 58.06 (2) 36Tennessee 13.49(43)
14Ohio 48.45(13) 37Louisiana 40.66(23)
15North Dakota 36.19(25) 38Georgia 17.02(37)
16Michigan 55.43 (5) 39North Carolina14.70(42)
17Colorado 43.24(21) 40Kentucky 15.75(40)
18Wyoming 50.81 (9) 41Alabama 15.94(38)
19Pennsylvania 52.13 (8) 42South Carolina 15.79(39)
20Wisconsin 44.86(18) 43Arkansas 12.37(44)
21Oregon 46.34(16) 44Mississippi 9.56(45)
22South Dakota 29.36(30) United States 43.54
Source: Social Security Act Amendments of 1949, p. 60. Not computed for Florida,
Texas, Vermont, or Oklahoma.
for December 1948 (Table 26 and Chart 8) is +O.51.'° While some of
the marked variation is attributable to circumstances peculiar to certain
states, the conclusion seems warranted that in many of the poorer states
the suppressed demand for general assistance would, in the event of depres-
sion, make itself felt." In good times most recipients of general assistance
10Thefigures for grant-aided categorical assistance are a striking contrast. Table 18
and Chart 6 show that the recipient rate for old age assistance tends to be inverse to
per capita income, the correlation for December 1948 being —0.58.
The Advisory Committee on Social Security to the Senate Committee on Finance
of the 80th Congress, 2nd Session, stated (Senate Document 204, pp. 6, 9): "Many
persons who do not fall within the categories of the aged, the blind, or dependent
children may be in dire need of public assistance. As now constituted, the Social
Security Act ignores the needs of this group. In point of fact, the act has led some
States to apply virtually all the State and local funds available for public assistance
to the specific programs for which federal reimbursement is available, leaving little
or no money for so-called general assistance....Presentcase loads in general
assistance and present expenditures for medical care reflect more nearly what States
and localities are able and willing to spend than the actual need for these services.
As long as the means to meet need are lacking, much need remains hidden. Few
people apply for help that they know they cannot get."PUBLIC ASSISTANCE GRANTS AND BUSINESS CYCLES 55
Table26
General Assistance, Number of Recipients per 100,000 Estimated Civilian
Population, by States, December 1946-1948
Rank Rankin
per Capita per Capita
income
1 945-47 1948 1947 1946 1945-47 1948 1947 1946
1Nevada 524297300 22Idaho 133156157
2New York 918997738 23Kansas 483497453
3California 767596535 24Missouri 849765892
4illinois 689640760 25Utah 550451446
5NewJersey 414348264 26Minnesota 676587594
6Montana 550538465 27Iowa 415357504
7Rhode Island 958788751 28Maine 901858779
8Massachusetts 798718660 29Arizona 327480916
9Maryland 252240929 30 NewHampshire723585560
10Washington 9168221,179 31NewMexico 463534512
11Ohio 831742671 32West Virginia 311335524
12North Dakota 346317299 33Tennessee 146129n.a.
13Michigan 1,154980918 34Louisiana 799480447
14Colorado 780700673 35Georgia 210220180
15Wyoming 363308347 36North Carolina218186176
16Pennsylvania 477516576 37Kentucky 226n.a.n.a.
17Wisconsin 461403414 38Alabama 253239198
18Oregon 996813 1,161 39South Carolina296283295
19South Dakota 241307343 40Arkansas 191203227
20Indiana 733693798 41Mississippi 38 37 29
21Nebraska 274310323
Source:Social Security Bulletin. Figures not available for Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Oklahoma, Texas, Vermont, or Virginia. Figures for the District of Colum-
bia, are omitted as untypical.
n.a: not available.
are unemployables not eligible for categorical assistance;12 in bad times
the number is swelled by employables not covered, or inadequately cov-
ered, by insurance schemes. Here, then, is a governmental expenditure,
demand for which is high in bad times and low in good times.
On several occasions the Federal Security Administration has advocated
federal grants for general assistance, variable in. terms of per capita income,
on the ground that they might enable 'poor' as well as 'rich" states to pro-
vide a minimum level of service. In its presentation to Congress it urged
state financial participation in general assistance. It reported in 1946 that
"in 15 states the entire financial burden for general assistance rests on the
localities and in 15 additional states the localities bear more than half the
cost".'3 This serves, of course, to hold down the coverage and the level of
general assistance. In the event of depression, the patchwork system might
The FSA estimated that in December 1948 of 400,000 cases on the general assis-
tance rolls about 330,000 were handicapped (Social Security Act Amendments of
1949, Part 1, p. 176).
Annual Report, 1946, p. 503.56 CHAPTER 3
Chart 8
Recipients of General Assistance per 100,000 Estimated Civilian
Population, December 1948, and Per Capita Income, 1945—1947, by States
Source: Tables 19 and 26
crack, and federal intervention on short notice to meet an emergency
become necessary. To those who regard general assistance as a final and
certain line of defense for residuals who fall through the network of other
social security provisions, a stronger system seems imperative. If it helped
to put a floor under consumption by enabling state and local governments
to provide a national minimum, such a system might bear a direct relation
to one important phase of economic stabilization.14
Of the 17 members of the Advisory Council on Social Security to the Senate Com-
mittee on Finance of the 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 14 favored the establishment
of federal grants for general assistance equal to a third of expenditures (Senate
Document 204, p. 14). The Council, of which Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., was Chair-
man and Sumner H. Slichter, Associate Chairman, stated: "there is an immediate
and imperative need to redress this imbalance", i.e., the concentration of state-local




























































600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800
Per capita income,1945—1947PUBLIC ASSISTANCE GRANTS AND BUSINESS CYCLES 57
6FEDERAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL OF 1949
FSA has riot been unaware of the criticisms of the present system of cate-
gorical grants. In 1949 it proposed that the federal interest in public
assistance as a whole be coordinated by a revised system of federal grants,
but did not recommend a new and separate system of grants for general
assistance alone. Instead, grants for general assistance were to be linked
with changes in the existing categorical grants so as to provide a system of
variable grants based upon per capita income with a federal share running
from 40 percent for the state with the highest per capita income to 75
percentfor the state with the lowest. This meant that richer states, which
currently are receiving grants of approximately 50 percent of approved
expenditure for old age assistance, dependent children, and the blind,
would receive less than 50 percent,15 whereas poorer states would receive
more than 50 percent. These changes by themselves would reduce total
federal grants for the existing three categories because the reductions
applicable to the richer states would exceed the increases applicable to
the poorer. Federal provision of grants for general assistance would, how-
ever, increase total grants for all public assistance going to every state,
although the increases would be relatively larger for the poorer states.16
During the Hearings on the Social Security Act Amendments of 1949, pp. 473-4,
Representative Lynch of N. Y. had the following colloquy with Commissioner
Altmeyer:
"Mr. Lynch: Is it not a fact that this looks like a one big package bill which carries
with it certain amount of money for States like New York, Pennsylvania and Cali-
fornia. But if the package is reduced and does not include in it every item that you
mentioned, instead of getting 60 percent aid on the categories it will go down to 40
percent? It will cost New York something like $14,000,000 or $15,000,000 a year to
make up out of its own tax rolls so as to carry on the services which are now being
carried?
Dr. Altmeyer: That is right.
Mr. Lynch: And is it not also a fact that this $230,000,000 which will be appropriated
under this bill must be raised through taxation, a large part of which will be paid
by the people in New York so that virtu ally it is costing the people in New York
more money by this proposition if you take the big package and it is going to cost
the State $15,000,000 if you take the smaller package without the general assistance
clause?
Dr. Altmeyer: There is no question about that."
Detailsof the dollar effect by states and categories are given in ibid., pp. 22-9.
Besides introducing grants for general assistance and altering their basis FSA wished
to raise the maxima in payments for dependent children and to include the cost of
medical services and certain welfare services as eligible for grants. If the states main-
tained at least the levels of December 1948 and all put the recommended changes into
effect general assistance would be increased $144 million, medical care $100 million,
and aid to dependent children $65 million (a net increase of $230 million); old age
assistance would be reduced $77 million and aid to the blind $2 million.58 CHAPTER 3
The FSA hoped that, under the new scheme, the states might eliminate all
categories and treat all groups of needy persons under public assistance as
one.17 In this respect it takes a step in the direction of flexibility. It might
also check further increases in payments for old age assistance as compared
with other categories of public assistance and with OASI, and diminish
relatively the flow of grants to the richer states. In some measure the FSA
scheme moves toward reducing the stimulus given since 1935 to the de-
velopment of categorical services, particularly old age assistance, in com-
parison with general assistance. Actually the pressure upon the states to
cut back on old age assistance would be slight, since the estimated reduc-
tion in total grants for this purpose would be only 10 percent in terms of
the December 1948 level and 23 percent for the states above average in
per capita income. And the FSA proposal does not affect interstate differ-
ences in eligibility. It does not set a standard in terms of fiscal effort states
must meet in order to earn grants; nor does it recommend changing the
ceilings per recipient, although they are so high as to be of limited applica-
bility for the poorer states. Finally, it does not directly recognize the issue
of cyclical variation in grants.
The FSA proposal could, however, be modified to take account of
cyclical changes in business activity if the federal percentages were in-
creased in bad years and decreased in good with the expectation that
thereby total expenditure might be increased or maintained in the former
and reduced in the latter. This variability would be superimposed upon the
variability introduced for the sake of equalization. The federal ratios might
range from, say, 50 to 85 percent in a bad year and from 30 to 65 percent
in a good year by gearing them to measures of fiscal capacity, such as in-
come payments. More will be said below concerning the cyclical adjust-
ment of grant ratios.
7PROPOSAL OF THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS
The Committee on Federal-State Relations, appointed by the Hoover
Commission, recommended in 1949 "that all... separategrants be re-
scinded and that a single comprehensive grant for [social, educational,
public health services and housing activities] in general be substituted"8
based partly on population and partly on per capita incomes. This recom-
mendation, of course, goes much beyond the limited issue of grants for
Thebill would require that within any category each needy person "be treated
consistently, taking into account his individual income and resources in determining
his need" (ibid., p. 165, quoting Mr. Altmeyer).
Senate Document 81, p. 240. The Committee does not give any details concerning
its recommendation.PUBLIC ASSISTANCE GRANTS AND BUSINESS CYCLES 59
publicassistance, but highlights one broad position concerning the federal
interest and responsibility for grants: that the states should be given a great
deal of autonomy. Its advocates imply that adequate development of wel-
fare functions, achievement of a national minimum, by state-local govern-
ments has been held back chiefly by lack of financial resources. The role of
the federal government should, therefore, be primarily fiscal, i.e., to sup-
plement deficient state-local finances by grants. The grants should be in
the form of block grants, given for broad categories. Carried to a logical
extreme this position would call for unconditional federal grants without
strings.'9 The Committee on Federal-State Relations does not go as far: it
declares that Congress should require uniform audits, reports, investi-
gation of performance by the appropriate federal agency, and minimum
standards for personnel. Nonetheless it urges that other conditions cur-
rently imposed be dropped.
Those who hold a more centralizing philosophy argue that the federal
government has responsibilities beyond safeguarding expenditure of its
money. State-local governments may sometimes not perceive the national
aspects of functions that constitutionally and traditionally belong to them.
If Congress decides to offer grants in order to assure recognition of the
national interest, it should impose conditions. And grants for broad cate-
gories may fail to induce state governments to foster specific activities in
which there is a federal interest.
Complete resolution of the two extreme positions is hardly possible, but
the demand for a reduction in federal conditions seems most plausible with
respect to old grants and to new grants when the purpose is primarily fiscal.
Old grants, which have been in operation long enough to raise state per-
formance at least to a minimum level, serve thereafter chiefly a fiscal pur-
pose and conditions relating to them might be relaxed or dropped. This
would, of course, permit the development of a system of broad categories.
It might permit also reducing federal grants if such grants could be elimi-
nated for the richer states and reduced for the poorer. Similarly, new grants
for functions concerning which the federal government did not wish to
attach conditions serve chiefly a fiscal purpose. But the situation is different
for other new functions. Federal interest in them may require the imposi-
tion of specific conditions.
8GRANTS BASED ON A 'STANDARD EFFORT' AND A 'NATIONAL MINIMUM'
An attempt will be made to analyze a plan for public assistance grants that
would establish limited conditions beyond which the states might be
'9In two other federal countries, Canada and Australia, provincial and state govern-
ments do receive large unconditional grants.60 CHAPTER 3
allowed wide discretion, and that would, moreover, attempt to gear the
federal grants directly to cyclical changes by placing a larger share of the
cost upon the federal government in depression and a smaller in prosperity.
As a result, total payments to recipients might be inverse to changes in
business activity.20
'Standard effort' is used to denote the percentage of income payments
a state (even the poorest) should itself spend for a welfare service as a
condition of federal aid. If, for example, the service is public primary and
secondary education, Congress might assume that any state (including both
state and local governments) would be willing to spend 2 percent of income
payments as a standard effort. It might arrive at this judgment by consider-
ing what states currently are spending or what, in. its opinion, they ought
to spend. In the case of a function that is relatively well appreciated and
cultivated by state-local governments —educationis often regarded as an
instance —theaverage effort being exerted might appear to be a good
measure of standard effort.2' In the case of a function that is ill appreciated
and poorly cultivated by state-local governments, the case is more difficult.
How judge what functions are ill appreciated? Looking back it may seem
that old age assistance before 1935 was neglected. At present, in the judg-
ment of some competent observers, the function of general assistance is
ill appreciated by many state and local governments. For example, 13 of
the 17 members of the Advisory Committee on Social Security to the
Senate Committee on Finance of the 80th Congress, 2nd Session, felt that
federal grants for this function were "an immediate and imperative need".22
In such a case what the states on the average happen to be doing may be an
unreliable guide to the standard effort.
'National minimum' means the floor or foundation level for a service
or group of services which, in the opinion of Congress, should be provided
even in the poorest state. For example, the 'national minimum' expenditure
for public primary and secondary education might be, say, $100 yearly
20Thisscheme was suggested by the Taft-Thomas-Hill bill for aid to education (80th
Cong., 1st Sess., S. 472).
21 Theassumption that education is well appreciated as a function is given some sup-
port by examining expenditure in terms of fiscal effort. In fiscal 1947, for example,
state and local governments on the average spent 1.77 percent of income payments
in 1946 for public elementary and secondary education. Of the 30 states whose per
capita income was below average 1945-47, 25 spent more than 1.77 percent of income
payments for education, and one spent 1.77 percent. In short, only 4 'poor' states did
not make an average fiscal effort. On the other hand, in the case of general assistance
24 of the 30 'poor' states spent less than the average percentage, 0.08. These figures
are from Social Security Act Amendments of 1949, p. 4, and from material supplied
by the FSA.
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per child of school age (5-17 years). Here again a judgment concerning
the appropriate figure would be easier for functions that are well cultivated
by state-local governments. In the case of education the number of eligible
recipients is fairly determinate because the number of school children is
known and every child 5 to 17 should presumably attend school. The
proper minimum level of expenditure per school child is debatable, and,
apart from one's social philosophy, depends upon the extent to which the
federal government wishes to set standards and attach conditions to its
grants. If the customary view is taken that primary and secondary educa-
tion is mainly a state and local matter and that the level is satisfactory,
except in 'poor' states, the average amount now being spent may be a guide.
For a function such as general assistance, the case is very different.
Objective information concerning the number of eligibles and the extent of
their need is not easily available. If grants are to be provided, should the
federal government leave decisions concerning eligibility and need to the
states? State-local governments in identical circumstances would probably
differ materially in their definitions of eligibility for general assistance. On
the other hand, deviations would not be easy to control by imposing federal
conditions, which, if the grants were open-end, would have to be more
rigorous than they are for any welfare program at present. Congress might,
indeed, choose not to make open-end grants for general assistance. It might
give a 'closed' grant by allocating to each state an annual sum which repre-
sented its estimate Of the appropriate federal interest in the function.23 In
any event, here again what the states on the average happen to be spending
for the function may be an unsafe guide to the national minimum.
9GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION
An idealized chart may serve to bring out more sharply the essence of
these concepts (Chart 9). Consider first the case of a function that is well
taken care of by state and local governments. In Panel A the states are
ranked from low to high according to expenditure per recipient if a 'stand-
ard effort' is made, that is, if revenue equal to some selected percentage
of state income payments is devoted to it. The ordinates, therefore, repre-
sent potential state-local expenditure per recipient and the line aZ1, sloping
upward to the right, shows the states ranked by this dollar expenditure if
a standard effort is made, A being the poorest and Z the richest. The line
cz indicates the national minimum expenditure per recipient as it might
be set by Congress. As drawn in Panel A, it is a level that could be
Obvious factors to use in calculating indices of relative need for such a welfare
service would be population, employment, labor force covered and uncovered by
Social Security programs.62
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achieved, or exceeded, by approximately half the states by making a
standard effort. The area acw represents the amount of federal grants
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required per recipient as a supplement to bring the level of the poorer states
up to the acceptable level. No grants would be received by states to the
right of W, and the fact that they were or were not spending amounts equal
to the level of the standard effort would be no concern of the federal
government. States to the left of W would, if they made (or exceeded) a
standard effort, receive grants equal to the difference between aw and cw.
State A, for example, would receive ac per recipient. The grants would be
variable-ratio, since state A might get half of its expenditure from the
federal treasury and state R only a quarter. Obviously by this approach the
federal government could achieve objectives in only a limited number of
states.
The grant program could of course be enlarged or reduced by setting
the minimum level higher or lower than in this illustration. A higher level
might be set on the premise that larger federal grants are desirable to relieve
the load carried by state-local governments and to better the service; a
lower, on the premise that attention should be concentrated on the poorer
states. The former would give a large grant program and the latter a small
one. Similarly, the grant program could be enlarged or reduced (the mini-
mum level being held constant) by raising or lowering the percentage
determined to be the standard effort. Requiring an effort level markedly
higher than the actual current level of state-local expenditure might, unless
offset by a very high minimum level, weaken or destroy the incentive to
earn the grants. What if state A decided to spend less per recipient from
its own resources than the standard effort, i.e., less than Aa? If the federal
government felt strongly that the minimum should be achieved, failure to
reach it might be penalized by paying a percentage lower than the state
would receive if it made a standard effort. If, however, the federal govern-
ment did not concern itself directly with state effort, it might decide that
its percentage grant would be maintained, i.e., that state A would get half
of whatever it did spend.24
Consider next the case of a function that will be assumed to be neglected
by state and local governments. If the federal government wished to stimu-
A scheme of variable grants (I) that includes the concepts of a minimum and a
standard effort will, under certain assumptions, lead to the same result as a scheme
(II) that simply has variable grants based on state income payments. if, under II,
a state raises and spends an amount equal to that required of it as a standard effort
under I, this brings an identical result. If, however, under II a state spends more
than that required as a standard effort under I, it will earn grants on the total, whereas
under I it earns grants only on the amount of the standard effort. Again under I, if
the federal government decides to pay a state the same percentage of whatever
amount the state spends below the minimum, the result is the same as under II. If,
however, it decides under I to pay lower percentages for amounts spent below the
minimum, the amounts received as grants will be less than under scheme II.64 CHAPTER 3
late state performance by grants and to steer the directions taken in per-
formance, it might decide that all or many of the states should be given
grants, and that all or many should receive direction as well.
The diagram in Panel A may be redrawn to illustrate the financial fea-
tures of such a grant (Panel B). The standard effort, line aZ1, is drawn so
that all of it falls below the horizontal line showing the national minimum,
thereby indicating that all states will receive a grant. The poorest state, A,
would get grants of 662/3 percent, ac, the richest, Z, grants of 162/3 per-
cent, Z1z.
10VARIATION IN MINIMUM LEVEL, NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS, AND
STANDARD EFFORT FROM DEPRESSION TO PROSPERITY
Since the minimum is presumably set at a foundation or subsistence level,
the amount per recipient (in real as distinct from money terms) may be
assumed not to differ greatly in a year of prosperity or of depression. The
number of recipients for a welfare program such as general assistance
would, however, vary widely during a business cycle, and this is not shown
by the Panels. On the other hand, the number of children of school age
would not vary cyclically.
The curve of standard effort as depicted in the Panels would, of course,
move up and down with business activity, since a given percentage of
income payments would produce a larger amount in a boom than in a
depression year. Let it be assumed that the base level of the standard effort
is set in relation to the situation in a boom year (aZ1 in Panel B). In a
depression year the line aZ1 would decline to say a1Z2, indicating a growth
of federal grants, measured in terms of expenditure per recipient, from
aZ1zc to a1Z2zc, while in prosperity the line would rise once more. These
variations are countercycical, since grants would increase in a depression
year and decrease in a prosperous year. They would thereby assist state
and local governments to provide welfare services at a time when their
fiscal capacity might be impaired, and to deter state-local governments
from expanding such services when their fiscal capacity seemed strong.
11APPLICATION TO A COMPREHENSIVE GRANT SCHEME
We now try to tie the scheme of the Committee on Federal-State Relations
concerning federal grants to the concepts developed above. The Commit-
tee's major criticism of existing grants —typicalof those who fear centrali-
zation in government —isthat they have usually been too specific. The
positive suggestion offered as a remedy is that Congress should vote grants
for broad rather than narrow categories of expenditure.
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issuch a broad category and that the federal government offered grants
for expenditure on it instead of on certain categories —oldage assistance,
the blind, dependent children, general assistance.25 How might this be set
up by Congress if the concepts of the 'national minimum' and the 'standard
effort' were used?
A 'closed', not an 'open-end', grant would seem in order because of
problems concerning the determination of the eligibility of recipients.
Under the present system of open-end grants for old age assistance, the
blind, and dependent children, the federal government does not attempt
to define conditions of eligibility except in such broad matters as residence
and age. The state and local governments decide what 'needy' persons are
put on the rolls, and their criteria differ greatly from state to state. As a
result the recipient rate is extremely diverse and persons in similar circum-
stances with respect to need do not receive the same assistance. Yet Con-
gress has tolerated this diversity because an attempt to define the condi-
tions of eligibility precisely, and to supervise their application, would
require so great an extension of federal authority and controls as to be
administratively difficult and politically distasteful. Eligibility for general
assistance is much more difficult to define and determine than that for old
age assistance, the blind, and dependent children. At present, without fed-
eral grants for general assistance, standards apparently differ greatly from
state to state. If open-end federal grants were offered, this diversity could
be expected to persist. The grants to many states would be responsive not
merely to their need but also to their liberality in putting people on the
rolls. And the annual appropriation required for grants would largely be
predetermined by the state-local authorities instead of Congress.
With problems of this sort in mind and guided by a decentralizing philos-
ophy, Congress might choose to set up a closed grant for public assistance.
The total governmental expenditure per year required for a minimum level
of public assistance services for the nation as a whole would have to be
calculated. It could not be expressed intelligently in average dollars per
recipient, since recipients would be in several categories. It could, how-
ever, be expressed in dollars per inhabitant. If, for example, Congress
decided that a total governmental expenditure of $2,400 million a year
would provide a minimum level of service, this would amount to approxi-
mately $16 per inhabitant. Congress would have to decide also upon the
portion to be borne by the state and local governments. If the decision was
$1,200 million, the standard effort (assuming income payments of $240
billion) would be half of 1 percent.
The Report of the Committee on Federal-State Relations (p. 239) indicates that
the categories it has in mind may be even broader than public assistance.66 CHAPTER 3
Allocation of the grant among the states, and the ratio for each state,
would be automatic. If a state had income payments of $1,800 million and
a population of 1,300,000, its national minimum would be $20,800,000,
the standard effort $9 million, the grants $11,800,000, and the ratio 57
percent. By this method, inequalities arising from the heterogeneity of state
standards would tend to disappear.
In the above illustration Congress would not say anything about the dis-
tribution of the grants among the different types of public assistance or
about a ceiling payment per recipient. A state might earn its total grant by
spending on one type of public assistance or on all, and by payments to
recipients which were, on the average, low or high. The concept of the
national minimum for public assistance would be interpreted to mean a
total annual expenditure per state, with no federal effort to translate this
into average payments to individual recipients in each category. The fed-
eral government, in order to determine the appropriate grant, would be
concerned to see that the sum spent annually by each state from its own
sources for public assistance equaled or exceeded the standard effort, and
also to see that its money was not misspent. But if some states chose to
spend relatively little for general assistance, this would be presumed to be
a matter of deliberate choice, not of irresponsibility. It would reflect a
belief that this form of public assistance was relatively less important to
them than other forms. The federal government, according to this ap-
proach, should not attempt to alter such state decisions.
Critics of this approach, as we have already observed, declare that the
federal government should be interested in establishing minimum stand-
ards for certain programs, and in the direction and amount of expenditures
by state-local governments. They argue that this is the more necessary
because the present public assistance program is 'unbalanced',2° and that
part at least of the unbalance has arisen because federal grants were avail-
able for old age assistance, the blind, and dependent children, not for
general assistance. Restoration of balance is, therefore, held to be a federal
responsibility and revision of the present scheme might work in this direc-
tion. FSA had this in mind in its 1949 proposal. By offering grants for
general assistance, by reducing total grants for old age assistance, and by
shifting the basis of all public assistance grants to per capita income, FSA
hoped "to remove the great disparities now existing in the treatment of
various classes of needy persons and to reduce the disparities among dif-
ferent parts of the country".27 It prefers to stick to open-end grants, yet is
The argument of unbalance is used to draw two quite different conclusions. Some
contend that additional federal grants for neglected functions should be offered;
others, that specific grants will always create lack of balance, and that the proper
approach is to broaden the purposes of grants.
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not prepared to set up tighter conditions for eligibility, although the dis-
parities among the states in this respect are already wide and introduction
of open-end grants for general assistance would bring a new set of dispari-
ties under federal auspices.
While a good deal of professional opinion could be mustered in support
of welfare grants that vary from state to state according to per capita
income, Congressional and public support is less certain. A scheme giving
relatively larger grants to poorer states may encounter opposition from
richer states, especially if the percentage grants in operation for categorical
assistance in the richer states are to be decreased. A member of Congress
from a 'rich' state, looking at the matter "from a practical standpoint", may
feel that the scheme "robs" his state.28 Even with respect to new grants,
representatives of richer states may coalesce into a bloc in opposition to
grant percentages that are less for them than for poorer states.
This political difficulty applies not only to the 1949 recommendations
of FSA but also to a plan that would confine welfare grants within a
national minimum and a standard effort. The latter plan, however, explic-
itly recognizes and sets up a framework within which grants can expand
and contract with cyclical fluctuations in business activity. Since the chief
cyclical impact of public assistance functions upon the states will be fiscal,
this might be an important advantage. For public assistance functions that
are already receiving federal grants, maintenance of established standards
of service will be difficult for many states in the event of severe depression.
For assistance functions, not now receiving grants, particularly general
assistance, severe depression might bring federal intervention as a rescue
operation. A system of grants for public assistance set up in advance and
based on a national minimum and a standard effort, would automatically
throw the depression burden of this function upon the federal government.
The completeness with which this scheme would reallocate the fiscal
burden during a cycle is one of its most important characteristics. The 1949
proposal of FSA would, of course, make no reallocation. If, for example,
the cost of general assistance to a particular state grew from $400,000 to
$800,000, the relative division of this amount would be the same in a year
of prosperity or of depression. And the countercyclical adjustment of the
FSA scheme which was discussed earlier (Sec. 6) would make an unim-
portant contribution in support of state finance. In the illustration above,
if the state share fell from 30 percent in a good year to 20 percent in a bad
one, the total expenditure by this particular state would nevertheless
23RepresentativeNoah M. Mason of Illinois, during an exchange with Mr. Altmeyer
on the Social Security Act Amendments of 1949, said: "I am afraid, sir, looking at
this proposition of yours from a practical standpoint that no Members of Congress,
and no member of this committee would vote for this variable grant basis which
would rob his State of several million dollars .. ." (p.470).68 CHAPTER 3
increase from $120,000to$160,000. Such an added financial burden
might be difficult to carry, and a scheme which shifts the depression burden
more completely to the federal government might be desired.
The minimum level-standard effort scheme goes very far in this direc-
tion. The completeness with which it works can be illustrated by making
more elaborate assumptions concerning general assistance. Assume that
all states get grants for general assistance, that the minimum level is $50
monthly per case, and that in a prosperous year the cases number 500,000.
This means a total annual expenditure of $300 million. Assume also that
the standard effort is set at a tenth of 1 percent of income payments of $240
billion, or a total of $240 million. The federal grant would then be $60
million, i.e., 20 percent of the total.
Suppose that onset of depression caused the recipients to double and
income payments to fall 10 percent. Total expenditure would rise to $600
million. With income payments down to $216 billion, the total state shares
would decline to $216 million. The federal share would rise to $384 million
—morethan sixfold, although relatively the increase would be simply from
20 to 64 percent of the total expenditure.
12DANGERS AND DIFFICULTIES IN COUNTERCYCLICAL ADJUSTMENT
OF GRANTS
The operation of a scheme for countercyclical variation in grants would
face certain dangers and difficulties. Consider first the implications of a
'closed' grant, assuming that Congress, for reasons explained in the pre-
ceding section, decided against an 'open-end' grant. Two technical difficul-
ties concerning timing would arise. The routine process of getting annual
federal appropriations is time consuming and inflexible. Unless coun-
tercyclical appropriations were given priority or a speedier procedure
adopted, proper timing might be impossible. A grant would require
also that a current measure of the need of individual states (reflecting
especially the potential number of recipients) be devised. Here the prob-
lem would be to ensure Congressional as well as statistical acceptability.
The exposition in Section 10 assumes that new figures of standard effort
should be calculated as new figures of income, statebystate,becomeavail-
able, and that the grants should be increased or reduced fairly promptly
in response to changes in income payments since an appreciable lag might
destroy the countercyclical effect.2° A question arises, therefore, concern-
ing the availability of figures which are reasonably current. Figures of
29Grantsfor public works, on the contrary, as will be argued below, should not neces-
sarily be geared to change in income payments because a prompt increase of public
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income payments, state by state, are on an annual basis and are available
seven months after the close of the year. National figures of quarterly
income payments are almost current, and rough quarterly measures of
state by state payments could be devised. Grants could be made in the
form of advances based on the rough measures and corrected later as final
figures became available. A question may be raised also concerning the
reliability of these figures state by state on a yearly basis. It would seem
that reliability could be attained even if it is not now present.
Cyclical adjustment might, indeed, be based on other measures than
income payments. Selma J. Mushkin makes the point that such physical
indices as the percentage employed (or unemployed) avoid the problems
of price adjustment and of selecting a base period that use of income
payments faces. Employment and unemployment would, however, appear
to be poor criteria of need in agricultural states. A more subtle question
concerns the relation of changes in income payments to tax potentials.
State tax revenues would not be uniformly affected by changes in income
payments. In general the revenues of states that rely most heavily upon
taxes on consumption would decrease less in depression than those of
states that rely upon taxes on income. The scheme outlined above neglects
this relationship. It assumes that federal grants should be adjusted directly
to changes in income payments.
The assumptions that the grants might be adjusted quarterly and geared
to yearly changes in income payments raise other difficulties. How can the
states budget without a more certain knowledge how much the federal
government will grant? No method of meeting this difficulty can be sug-
gested, but one may question its importance. An increase in grants, such
as would occur in depression, might require alteration of state budgetary
plans, but this should not be embarrassing. The return of prosperity would
bring a decrease in grants and a more awkward alteration in budgetary
plans. In terms of countercyclical effect, however, federal pressure to cur-
tail state expenditure at such a time might be regarded as desirable.
Another and related difficulty arises from the fact that variations in
income payments for some states may differ appreciably from the varia-
tion in the national total. Marked yearly changes in the figures for certain
states would, under a countercyclical scheme, bring marked increases or
decreases in grants. The latter, at least, might cause protest, although the
pressure of a decrease in federal grants in response to an increase in income
payments for a state might be regarded as desirable.
The belief is widely held that the federal grant percentage should not
rise for any state above approximately 75 percent because this might
impair state-local administration of a function. The essence of a program70 CHAPTER 3
of conditional grants is that administration and supervision be in state-
local hands, and effective performance might be impaired when their finan-
cial participation fell to a low figure. If the state-local share in a 'poor'
state fell below say, 25percent,the alternative would appear to be com-
plete federal assumption of the function.3° Yet such a step in a few 'poor'
states might be unconstitutional and certainly would be open to the objec-
tion that a dual system is administratively and politically undesirable.
What, then, if measures of need and effort pointed to a higher percentage?
Obviously the higher the minimum and the steeper the slope of the curve
of effort, the more often would this situation be encountered.31 In case of
conifict between administrative and prudential considerations which sug-
gest a ceiling of 75percent,and considerations of program needs which
indicate a higher figure, a choice would have to be made. If the decision
were in favor of the former, it would appear necessary to specify that
federal payments should not exceed 75 percent. In Panel B of Chart 9
this means that an effort line such as a1Z3 would flatten out at its left end.
It might, indeed, be argued that a rise in the federal share above 75percent,
which is caused by depression and which for this reason is temporary,
would be less dangerous than a federal share that is, at all times, above
75percent.The requirement that every state should continue, in depression
as in prosperity, to exercise a standard effort, might also serve to curb
financial irresponsibility growing out of a low state percentage.
Any countercyclical scheme runs the danger that Congress might hesi-
tate to reduce grants during prosperity. If, for example, the present sup-
pressed demand for general assistance were satisfied in depression through
a federal grant program, expenditures might not shrink proportionall.y
with the return of prosperity. For one thing, the backlog of eligible appli-
cants would probably be added gradually to the rolls, which would hold
expenditures at a higher level; for another, lowering the level of expenditure
might meet political resistance. Just as expenditure for categorical assis-
tance has risen to levels which, in 1935, were wholly unforeseen, so might
that for general assistance. The framework of the scheme outlined above
is designed to forestall this eventuality, but it might not remain intact. In
this event the countercyclical effects would be overlaid, if not destroyed,
In Canada the federal government has for some years given grants of 75percent
for old age assistance (pensions). Federal officers have been dissatisfied with this
arrangement on the ground mentioned above.
Compared with prewar the relative spread among the states in per capita income
has greatly narrowed. For example, in 1941 Mississippi, at the bottom of the scale,
had a per capita income of $195,andNevada, at the top, one of $960; in 1946 the
figures for these states, still the lowest and highest, were $555and$1,703 respec-
tively. An effort curve would, therefore, slope less in 1946 than in 1941.PUBLIC ASSISTANCE GRANTS AND BUSINESS CYCLES 71
and state-local expenditures might be swelled unnecessarily. Expansion
of expenditure for any one function, say general assistance, would have
an adverse effect upon state-local performance of other functions.
Opposition to a decrease in prosperity of a grant percentage that had
been raised in depression would be intense. In the case of public assistance
grants it would be rooted in poignant human situations. Most persons
affected by a decrease in this type of expenditure would be unemployables
or marginal employables. Payments would seldom be more than enough
for a minimum living standard and would not give some recipients even
that. Federal action reducing grants for these payments would strike many
citizens as inappropriate, the more so because it would inevitably occur
when the fiscal position of the federal government was good. The rejoinder
would be that state-local governments should maintain payments to indi-
viduals at the proper level from their own resources, and that a decrease
in the federal percentage was merely in response to a change in cyclical
indices. But the onus would appear to be on the federal government
because upon it would fall the responsibility for initiating the change.
Obviously also the higher the level reached by the federal share, the more
difficult in all respects would be the reversion.
Sufficient analysis has perhaps been given to enable a reader to draw con-
clusions concerning the different positions. Whatever these may be, it
should be borne in mind that a grant scheme for public assistance as a
whole, or for selected categories, can be formulated that may assist state
and local governments to maintain or expand payments in depression
when, without such a scheme, they would be unable to do so, and that may
restrain state and local governments from expanding payments in prosper-
ity merely because their fiscal capacity appears to be improved.